Job-Search Periods for Welfare Applicants: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment by Bolhaar, Jonneke et al.
 Department of Economics 
School of Business, Economics and Law at University of Gothenburg  
Vasagatan 1, PO Box 640, SE 405 30 Göteborg, Sweden  
+46 31 786 0000, +46 31 786 1326 (fax) 
www.handels.gu.se    info@handels.gu.se 
      
 
 
 
WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS 
 
 
No 648 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Job-Search Periods for Welfare Applicants: 
Evidence from a Randomized Experiment 
 
Jonneke Bolhaar, Nadine Ketel, and Bas van der Klaauw 
 
 
March 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 1403-2473 (print) 
ISSN 1403-2465 (online) 
 
 
 
Job-Search Periods for Welfare Applicants:
Evidence from a Randomized Experiment
Jonneke Bolhaar∗, Nadine Ketel†, Bas van der Klaauw‡
March 2, 2016
Abstract
This paper studies mandatory job-search periods for welfare applicants. During this
period the benefits application is put on hold and the applicant is obliged to make
job applications. We combine a randomized experiment with detailed administra-
tive data to investigate the effects of imposing a job-search period. We find strong
and persistent effects on the probability to collect welfare benefits. The reduced
benefits are fully compensated by increased earnings from work. Furthermore, we
do not find evidence of adverse consequences for the most vulnerable applicants.
Our results therefore suggest that a job-search period is an effective instrument for
targeting welfare-benefits applicants.
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1 Introduction
Many countries have some welfare system which provides benefits to low-income house-
holds. Welfare then acts as a safety net guaranteeing a minimum level of income. In
the United States, welfare is mostly used to support single-parent households. In Euro-
pean countries, it also supports long-term unemployed workers, who are no longer entitled
to social-insurance benefits. Whereas welfare aims at households with a low capability
of generating sufficient income, governments often have imperfect information about the
income-generating potential of a household. This may induce moral hazard, which causes
excess spendings on welfare benefits. Currently, there is a tendency among policy makers
in many countries to restrict access to benefit schemes and to be more strict on job-search
requirements. Causal evidence on the effect on take up of more stringent entry require-
ments is, however, scarce (Currie, 2006).
This paper evaluates mandatory job-search periods for individuals applying for welfare
benefits. During such a four-week period the application is put on hold, and applicants
are supposed to make many job applications. The application for welfare benefits is only
activated if the applicant returns to the welfare agency after the job-search period. Benefits
are then paid from the moment of the initial application. Therefore, the mandatory job-
search period does not change eligibility or the amount of benefits, but only postpones the
first payment. To evaluate such job-search periods we conducted a randomized experiment
between April 2012 and March 2013, incorporating the full population of welfare applicants
with a potential to work in the city of Amsterdam. Combining various data sources
we construct a very detailed administrative dataset describing the participants in the
experiment. This allows us to not only look at the implications of a job-search period
on welfare benefits receipt, but also study the effect on alternative sources of income. In
addition, we can establish whether a job-search period increases the likelihood to engage
in criminal activities.
A job-search period can affect labor-market outcomes in several ways. First, the job-
search requirement can increase the likelihood to find a job and thereby reduce the like-
lihood to receive welfare benefits. During the job-search period workers have to search
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very actively, but they can themselves decide to which jobs to apply. Once starting col-
lecting welfare benefits workers should accept all jobs offered to them. Black et al. (2003)
suggest that announcing obligations may stimulate benefits recipients to find work. Sec-
ond, a job-search period makes the application process for welfare benefits more complex
and increases the costs of applying. After the job-search period, applicants have to pay
a second visit to the welfare office to confirm their application for welfare benefits. This
can decrease the likelihood to receive benefits even in absence of an effect on job finding.
Both mechanisms can serve as a self-selection or self-screening device (Parsons, 1991),
but possibly effect a different part of the population of applicants. An increase in job
finding reduces take up of applicants with relatively good labor-market prospects, while
increased complexity discourages applicants that do not find a job but cannot deal with
the complexity of the application process.1
Several studies document a decrease in take up of means-tested welfare benefits as a
result of increased application costs or complexity of the application process (e.g. Bhar-
gava and Manoli (2015), Currie and Grogger (2001), Krueger (1990), Bitler et al. (2003)
and Brien and Swann (1999)). These increased application costs include requiring more
frequent visits to the welfare office, reduced re-certification intervals or requiring extensive
income documentation. Kleven and Kopczuk (2011) model complexity as an instrument
used by program administrators to extract a better signal of true eligibility, which is chosen
jointly with benefit levels and eligibility rules in the design of a program. In all these cases
the question remains whether (non-financial) barriers target the desired population. The
mentioned studies report a decrease in take up, but do not observe the source of income of
non-recipients. Without this it cannot be established whether the intended goal is accom-
plished. We exploit the availability of extensive administrative data in the Netherlands to
follow participants in our experiment. This allows us to combine the advantages of field
experiments and administrative data.
1A third mechanism could run via time-inconsistent preferences (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). Many
costs of applying for welfare are borne immediately, whereas benefits are received later. Hence, a job-
search period might discourage a person who puts more weight on the present than on the future to carry
through the application for benefits, even though it would be utility maximizing to receive benefits at a
later date.
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The requirement in the job-search period relates our study to the literature on the
effectiveness of active labor-market policies. The majority of this literature concentrates
on programs aimed at recipients of unemployment insurance benefits with relatively good
employment prospects (for an overview, see Card et al. (2010)). Welfare recipients are often
more disadvantaged and at risk of leaving the labor force permanently, so the potential
gains of effective programs for welfare applicants can be large. Furthermore, for credit-
constrained welfare applicants small financial incentives can matter a lot. For example,
Van der Klaauw and Van Ours (2013) find that imposing benefit sanctions substantially
increases the individual transition rate from welfare to work in the Netherlands. Card and
Robins (1998) show that the financial incentives in the Canadian self-sufficiency program
induced welfare recipients to work more. However, randomized experiments with welfare
applicants are scarce. Given the vulnerability of the population, authorities are not very
likely to agree with a randomized experiment. This is particularly true when evaluating
existing policies (in contrast to the evaluation of additional policies or resources).
The setup of our randomized experiment is similar to a so-called encouragement design
(Duflo et al., 2007). However, whereas in the usual encouragement design treatment is
encouraged on a randomly selected group of subjects and there are no costs of noncompli-
ance, we impose a stronger encouragement causing higher compliance rates. We randomize
treatments over caseworkers, who receive the instruction to apply one particular treatment,
a default option, to all their new clients in a given period. In case the default option is
really not appropriate, caseworkers are allowed to deviate but should provide a motiva-
tion. The possibility to deviate increases support for the experiment among caseworkers.
The design exploits the random assignment of applicants to caseworkers within each local
welfare office.2 Our empirical strategy is similar to Maestas et al. (2013), who exploit
variation in examiners’ allowance rates as an instrument for disability benefit receipt, us-
ing that applicants are randomly assigned to disability examiners.3 Also, Cre´pon et al.
2Within a local office all caseworkers have the same target concerning exit to work. The random
assignment of applicants to caseworkers ensures that all caseworkers have the same fair chance to meet
the target. This also allows the welfare agency to benchmark caseworkers.
3We can not exploit the natural variation per caseworker, because aside from the decision about a
job-search period caseworkers are also responsible for the further guidance of the applicant towards a job.
And there may be differences between caseworkers in how successful they are in providing guidance.
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(2013) used an encouragement design to evaluate active labor-market programs in France.
Compared to these two studies, the variation that we can exploit is somewhat higher. Our
study has a compliance rate to the random treatment assignment of 46 percent compared
to 35 percent in Cre´pon et al. (2013), while Maestas et al. (2013) exploit natural variation
of 23 percent.
We find a strong and persistent negative effect of a job-search period on the likelihood
to receive welfare benefits. Imposing a job-search period reduces the likelihood to receive
benefits by 20 percentage points. The effect is significant up to six months after registra-
tion, and during these months total welfare benefits payments are about 25 percent lower.
There is no spillover to other benefits schemes and the lower income from welfare bene-
fits is fully compensated (112 percent) by higher earnings. A job-search period does not
increase the likelihood to engage in criminal activities. The fact that the reduced income
from benefits is fully compensated by higher earnings suggests that a job-search period
targets the desired population of applicants, which is confirmed by a subgroup analysis.
The effect of a job-search period increases with education. For applicants with at least
a bachelor degree the likelihood to receive benefits decreases with 50 percent. We find
no evidence of negative side effects of a job-search period for the most vulnerable appli-
cants. Only for higher educated applicants the job-search period increases the probability
to have a very low income. Finally, we find that the estimated local average treatment
is not sensitive to changes in the sample and the group of compliers. This implies that
caseworkers do not succeed in targeting job-search periods to those applicants for which
the effects are largest.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides details
about the Dutch benefit system, explains the experimental design and provides evidence
on compliance rates. Section 3 describes the data and provides evidence on the random
assignment. In section 4 we discuss the empirical strategy and identification. Section 5
presents the main results, while section 6 assesses the heterogeneity of treatment effects.
Section 7 discusses the generalizability of our results by interpreting the estimated local
average treatment effect. Section 8 concludes.
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2 Setting and experimental design
Welfare in the Netherlands
In the Netherlands, welfare serves as a safety net and provides households that have no
or not enough means of living with a minimum income level. Welfare benefits are means
tested (on both income and wealth) and the benefits level only depends on the composition
of the household. Rules about eligibility and the level of benefits are determined nation-
wide, but the responsibility for the implementation is at the municipality level. Welfare is
paid from general taxation and municipalities receive from the Ministry of Social Affairs
a fixed annual budget for managing their welfare system, of which any unused excess may
be kept.4
The regular benefits range from 70 percent of the minimum wage for a single-person
household to 100 percent for a couple with children. During our observation period the
(nationwide) net minimum wage was about 1200 euros per month. Municipalities can give
additional benefits on top of the regular benefits. Amsterdam pays a housing allowance
to welfare benefits recipients of 133 euro per month. Furthermore, all Dutch households
with low income are entitled to housing subsidies, health-insurance subsidies and child
subsidies.5 Unlike in the US, there is no maximum to the time period that a household
can receive welfare benefits (or subsidies). If a welfare recipient finds part-time employment
or has part-time employment with earnings below the welfare benefits level, earnings have
a marginal tax rate of 100 percent. For the health-insurance and housing subsidies other
marginal tax rates apply (child subsidies are not income related).
Individuals apply for benefits at the local welfare office in their city district. The appli-
cant is next invited for an intake meeting with a caseworker, during which the rights and
obligations of receiving welfare benefits are explained. Applicants have to bring extensive
proof of their (past) income, bank accounts, housing etc. to this meeting. Based on this
information, supplemented with information from administrative sources, it is determined
4In 2012, the municipality of Amsterdam spent 103 percent of its budget for welfare which was also
the average for all municipalities in the Netherlands.
5The maximum monthly amounts of these subsidies are 309 euro (for housing subsidies), 70 euro
(health-insurance subsidies) and per child 84 euro (child subsidies).
6
whether an individual is entitled to benefits. Welfare recipients have to comply with job-
search requirements, and are obliged to accept all jobs, irrespective of the match with their
education or work experience. These obligations are set by the national government, but
the municipality has discretion in deciding about how welfare recipients are supported in
their job search and how the number of welfare recipients is kept under control.
Setting of experiment
The sample for our experiment consists of individuals that applied for welfare benefits in
Amsterdam between April 2012 and March 2013 and who should be able to find regular
employment within six months. The latter is determined through a computerized pro-
gram that profiles all workers based on their characteristics. These characteristics include,
among others, work history, age, education, language and computer skills, recent deten-
tion and psychological problems. Based on this profile the applicant is classified in one of
four classes. The type and intensity of guidance given to the applicant and the required
job-search effort varies over these classes.
Mandatory job-search periods are only applied to the class of applicants that should
be able to find regular employment within six months, so the population participating in
our experiment. In addition, we restrict the experiment to individuals that are at least
27 years old, as different rules apply to welfare recipients under age 27. These selection
criteria apply to approximately 25 percent of the total inflow (2860 applicants). The
welfare recipients in Amsterdam are divided over five welfare offices serving workers in
different districts.
Amsterdam has a relatively large population of welfare recipients. In January 2012,
6.4 percent of the population between 20 and 65 years old received welfare benefits in
Amsterdam (i.e. 34,550 individuals) compared to 3.1 percent in the Netherlands. Dur-
ing 2012, the inflow into welfare in Amsterdam consisted of 11,706 individuals while in
the same year 8,944 individuals stopped receiving benefits. The larger inflow is a direct
result of the economic conditions. Figure B1 in the appendix shows GDP growth for the
Netherlands and inflow and outflow into welfare benefits in Amsterdam from 2008 until
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2014. At the time of the experiment, in 2012 and the first half of 2013, the Dutch economy
was suffering from a second downturn as a consequence of the financial crisis. Worsening
economic conditions have both a direct and a lagged effect on inflow into welfare benefits.
If unemployment increases, it will directly increase the inflow into welfare benefits for in-
dividuals that have no or limited entitlement to unemployment insurance benefits. From
individuals that can first deplete their unemployment insurance benefits there will be a
delayed inflow into welfare benefits.
During the experiment we asked caseworkers to fill in a form with information about
the applicant in each intake meeting. Table A1 in the appendix gives a description of
the population that took part in the experiment, based on these forms. The caseworkers
report that 26 percent of the applicants have a bad financial situation. The applicants
are considered to be relatively independent, which is probably related to the fact that
they are classified as being able to find employment within six months. 24 percent of the
applicants applied for benefits directly after losing (self-)employment, while the remainder
either depleted their unemployment insurance benefits or applied for another reason. Other
reasons to apply for welfare include exhaustion of savings, divorce, less hours at an existing
job such that the total earnings drop below the welfare level, etc. Finally, 56 percent of
the applicants are non-western immigrants and 47 percent of the applicants have received
welfare benefits before.
Intervention: Mandatory job-search period
Our experiment focuses on the job-search period, which was introduced by the welfare
agency in 2011. A job-search period postpones the application for welfare benefits with at
most four weeks, during which the individual has to actively search for work. The applica-
tion for benefits will only be activated if the applicant returns to the welfare agency after
the job-search period. If the welfare application is activated and processed, the applicant
will (retrospectively) receive benefits starting at the date of the initial registration. A
job-search period thus only delays the first payment of benefits, it does not reduce the
amount of benefits that an individual is entitled to. Applicants who find employment dur-
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ing a job-search period can file a request for receiving the welfare benefits for the period
between the date of registration and the starting date of new employment. This requires
completing the application process and is not actively promoted by the welfare agency. So
most individuals that find a job during the job-search period do not use this possibility.
Figure 1 gives a schematic representation of the application process for welfare benefits
in Amsterdam, including the job-search period. Irrespective of the job-search period, the
welfare application needs to be processed within eight weeks after the day of registration.
The decision to apply a job-search period is made during the intake meeting and, before
the experiment, was left to the caseworkers’ discretion. However, job-search periods should
not be applied if an applicant has severe financial problems or can prove that she has been
very active in applying for jobs prior to registration at the welfare agency. An applicant
cannot refuse a job-search period. When imposing a job-search period the caseworker
specifies a minimum number of job applications that the applicant should make within
the job-search period. The caseworker also stresses that during the job-search period the
applicant can still choose which jobs to apply to, but as soon as the applicant starts
receiving welfare benefits it is mandatory to accept all jobs. If the applicant returns from
a job-search period, the caseworker generally checks whether the applicant has complied
with the job-search requirement, and can impose a sanction if this is not the case. This
sanction is generally a 30 percent reduction in benefits for the duration of one month. In
practice, these sanctions are almost never applied.
Experimental design
To isolate the causal effect of a job-search period we conducted a randomized experiment in
which we manipulated the assignment of job-search periods.6 Applicants are not informed
about the experiment, to prevent that this knowledge would influence their behavior. In-
stead of randomizing the treatments over individuals, we randomized the treatments over
caseworkers. Caseworkers received the instruction to apply one particular treatment to
all their new clients during a three-month period. This particular treatment we call their
6The original research design, including a power analysis, can be found at http://personal.vu.nl/
b.vander.klaauw/OnderzoeksOpzetDWI.pdf (in Dutch).
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Figure 1: Welfare application procedure
default option, which makes our design similar to an encouragement design (Duflo et al.,
2007). We instructed caseworkers to deviate from the default option only in cases where
the default option is really not appropriate. The possibility to deviate in special cases
helped to make the experiment more acceptable for caseworkers and in getting their com-
mitment to the experiment. Our design exploits that within local offices welfare applicants
are randomly allocated to caseworkers. The matching of applicants to caseworkers is an
administrative process, in which welfare applicants are matched to the caseworker with
the lowest case load.
There are three different default options:
• Never: never impose a job-search period.
• Always: always impose a job-search period if the financial situation of the individual
allows for it.
• Normal: the decision to impose a job-search period is left to the discretion of the
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Figure 2: Percentage of applicants that was given a job-search period by default option,
over time
caseworker.
In the remainder we refer to these default options as ‘never’, ‘always’ and ‘normal’. The
default option ‘normal’ shows what the caseworkers would do with the applicant in absence
of the experiment, which allows us to study targeting by caseworkers. The experimental
period was divided into four periods of three months. Each period the caseworkers received
a new default option which they had to apply to all new applicants assigned to them in
this period. This allows us to control for business cycle effects. The randomization of
default options over caseworkers took place at the level of the welfare office.
For the success of the experiment it is crucial that compliance to the default options is
sufficiently high. Before the start of the experiment we organized meetings with all case-
workers to inform them about the experiment. At the start of every three-month period
each caseworker was instructed individually about her new default option. Caseworkers
were asked to fill in a form about the applicant at each intake meeting. The forms were
personalized for each caseworker and had the period-specific default option printed on the
form, such that they were constantly reminded of their current default option. We kept
track of the inflow and regularly tried to visit caseworkers if they had not filled in the
forms for new applicants or deviated substantially from their given default option. Dur-
ing the experiment, we visited the welfare offices almost weekly to answer questions from
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caseworkers, pick up forms and to keep an eye on the implementation of the experiment.7
Compliance rates
Figure 2 shows the fraction of job-search periods applied per default option during the
experimental period. The distinction between the three default options is most pronounced
at the start of the experiment. The percentage of job-search periods given under the
default ‘always’ remained relatively stable over time, while it increased for the other two
default options. During the experiment period, we communicated with 112 caseworkers.
Some caseworkers left, and new caseworkers entered the organization and took over their
caseload. Furthermore a few times the caseload of a sick caseworker was taken over by
a colleague. Such cases are associated with a larger noncompliance in both the default
options ‘always’ and ‘never’. On average, during the experimental period, caseworkers
with the default option ‘never’ gave a job-search period to nine percent of the applicants,
caseworkers with default option ‘always’ gave a job-search period to 55 percent of the
applicants, and caseworkers with default option ‘normal’ gave a job-search period to 46
percent of the applicants.
3 Data
Data sources
Our analysis employs data from three different sources, that are linked using unique iden-
tifiers for each individual. The welfare agency of Amsterdam provides administrative in-
formation on the date of registration at the welfare office, date of application for welfare,
start and end date of collecting welfare benefits, whether a job-search period is applied
and the identity of the caseworker that conducted the intake meeting. The individual
7The forms are filled in for 72 percent of the observations. Given that all information is also available
through the administrative records (for the full sample), we do not use the information from the forms in
our empirical analysis. Initially, we introduced the forms because we were not sure if the administrative
system of the welfare office would also include applicants that applied for benefits but never returned
after a job-search period. This turns out to be the case. However, for the experiment the forms were very
useful as the period-specific default option was printed on them and it gave us a reason to regularly check
caseworkers.
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characteristics of applicants that are registered in these data are date of birth, gender,
household composition and highest level of education. Furthermore, we observe the exact
benefits payments. Second, we use data from the national social insurance administration
to observe daily information for each individual on the amount of income from employ-
ment, hours worked and income from other benefit schemes.8 We have this information for
all participants in the experiment from 2008 until October 2013. The retrospective nature
of the data allows us to construct a labor-market history for all individuals, which is a
control variable. Third, we link the data to individual records of all Dutch citizens kept
by Statistics Netherlands. Using these records we determine whether an individual was
suspect of a crime in a given year. The data from both Statistics Netherlands and from
the national social insurance administration cover the full population of the Netherlands
such that the experiment sample is matched without attrition.
Sample
Based on inflow in previous years we expected 2500 individuals to participate in the exper-
iment. Our initial power calculation was based on this inflow number. Our final sample
consists of 2860 welfare applications (2709 unique individuals).9 The economic downturn
may explain the slightly higher inflow. 38 welfare applicants have an incorrect personal
identifier, such that we can not match them to their outcomes. For eight applicants infor-
mation on their caseworker is missing, so we can not determine under which default option
they were treated. Furthermore, for 24 applicants information on the job-search period is
incomplete, and for seven applicants information on essential controls is missing (gender,
age or household situation). This means that in total we exclude 72 observations from
the analysis, which leaves us with 2788 observations (2640 unique individuals). For 64 of
the 72 excluded observations we have information on the default option. The excluded
observations are evenly distributed among the three default options (joint p-value is 0.70).
8The other benefit schemes include unemployment insurance benefits and disability insurance benefits.
We also observe whether someone receives welfare benefits in another municipality. Only data on income
from self-employment are missing.
9An individual can have multiple applications if he/she applies for benefits multiple times within our
experimental period. The average number of days elapsed between consecutive applications is 112.
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Table 1: Characteristics of applicants under different default options
Full Default option P-value difference
Sample Normal Always Never Normal Normal Always
vs vs vs
Always Never Never
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Background characteristics
Female 39% 39% 41% 36% 0.45 0.44 0.07
Partner 11% 12% 9% 8% 0.79 0.68 0.57
Children 14% 14% 15% 13% 0.47 0.72 0.58
Age under 30 25% 24% 25% 27% 0.56 0.13 0.30
Age 31 - 36 25% 23% 28% 27% 0.07 0.12 0.82
Age 37 - 45 26% 27% 24% 24% 0.17 0.22 0.96
Age above 45 24% 25% 23% 22% 0.31 0.07 0.37
Bachelor/Master 28% 27% 28% 31% 0.66 0.59 0.52
Vocational 23% 24% 24% 21% 1.00 0.53 0.47
High school 13% 11% 16% 13% 0.06 0.85 0.08
Preparatory vocational 20% 21% 17% 20% 0.04 0.68 0.19
Primary education 10% 10% 11% 10% 0.35 0.29 0.94
Education missing 2% 3% 2% 1% 0.37 0.30 0.79
Annual income in previous 13.6 13.5 13.4 14.2 0.31 0.95 0.34
2 years (x1000 e)
Treatment
Job-search period applied 40% 46% 55% 9% 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of observations 2788 1657 571 560
Note: The p-values in the last three columns are weighted by the office of registration, as randomization
took place within welfare office.
The first column of Table 1 provides information about background characteristics. The
majority of the applicants (over 60 percent) are male. Applicants are relatively young, the
average age in the sample is only 38.4 years, with the median at 36 years. Recall that our
sample includes only individuals older than 27 years. Young people have had less time
to build up work history and, therefore, have in general shorter maximum unemployment
insurance entitlement (they also have, on average, less wealth and are more often single).
The average annual income in the two years before the welfare application is approximately
13,600 euro. Given that welfare is means tested and the income of the partner is taken
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into account in the means test, couples are less likely to qualify for welfare. In our sample
only 11 percent of the applicants have a partner, and 14 percent have children. The singles
with children are almost exclusively women. Finally, 28 percent of the applicants have at
least a bachelor’s degree (compared to 35 percent in the total population aged 25-55 in
the Netherlands).
Random assignment
Our design hinges on the fact that within local welfare offices applicants are randomly
allocated to caseworkers, and are, therefore, also randomly assigned to default options.
The second to fourth column of Table 1 show the mean characteristics of applicants under
the default options ‘normal’, ‘always’ and ‘never’. Columns five to seven show the p-value
of the difference between two groups, for all different combinations. The characteristics
are well balanced over the three treatment groups. There are no systematic differences
and for only five out of 42 reported characteristics the difference is significantly different
from zero. The lower panel in Table 1 shows the treatment probability for applicants in
each of the three treatment groups and the number of observations per treatment group.
The treatment group with the default ‘normal’ is the largest, as this was agreed upon with
the welfare agency in the original research design.
Table A2 in the appendix shows the characteristics of only the applicants under the
default option ‘normal’. In this treatment group the decision to impose a job-search
period was left to the caseworker. The first column describes the applicants that did not
get a job-search period and the second column those that did get a job-search period.
The third column gives the p-value of the difference. This table provides insight on how
caseworkers target the job-search period in a non-experimental setting. The results in
this table confirm that without experimental manipulation caseworkers target job-search
periods., for example, to young applicants and those without children.
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Descriptive statistics of the outcome variables
Table 2 displays information on the outcome variables. We mainly look at outcomes up
to six months after registration. At that moment 50 percent of the applicants are still
collecting welfare benefits. Average cumulative welfare payments are almost 3,000 euro in
the six months after registration and average earnings are about 2,500 euro. Income from
other benefits (mainly unemployment insurance benefits and disability insurance benefits)
are 511 euro. Total income is the sum of these three income sources (welfare benefits,
wage earnings and other benefits).
Job-search periods delay the first welfare benefits payment causing that people who
have very limited wealth will be without income for some period. This may trigger crim-
inal behavior. Therefore, we also consider crime as a relevant outcome. Our data are
informative on whether someone was a crime suspect in a given year. The exact date of
the crime is not reported. We consider crime outcomes in 2012 and 2013, which implies
that for some people the crime might have taken place before applying for welfare benefits.
However, given our randomized design there is no reason to suspect a difference in crime
rates before the start of the experiment between groups. Table 2 shows that about nine
percent of the applicants were suspect of a crime in 2012 or 2013.
4 Empirical strategy and graphical evidence
Empirical strategy
To estimate the effect of a job-search period on welfare receipt and other income variables
we assume a linear relationship. The outcomes of individual i observed t time periods
after registering for welfare benefits at time τ at welfare office w are denoted by Yiτtw and
SPiτw is an indicator for a job-search period. Our regression model is specified as
Yiτtw = ατt + γwt + δtSPiτw +Xiβt + uiτtw (1)
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the outcome variables
Mean SD
Labor-market outcomes
Applicants on welfare after 6 months 51% 50
Cum. welfare benefits received over 6 months (in e) 2953 2413
Cum. earnings over 6 months (in e) 2494 3766
Cum. other benefits over 6 months (in e) 511 1715
Cum. total income over 6 months (in e) 5957 3653
Nr of weeks with benefits >0 over 6 months 16.2 10.8
Cum. hours worked over 6 months 190 266
Mean hourly wage 6 months after (in e, if wage>0) 13.3 6.3
Crime outcomes
Suspect of a crime in 2012 or 2013 9% 28
Suspect of a property crime in 2012 or 2013 4% 20
Number of applicants 2788
We estimate this model separately for different elapsed durations t since applying for
welfare benefits. The vector Xi contains a set of covariates including age, gender, partner
status, an indicator for children, cumulative income in the 24 months before registration
and dummies for five education categories. ατt and γwt are fixed effects for the quarter
of registration and the local welfare office, which are allowed to differ for any duration.
The former takes business cycle effects into account and the latter controls for possible
differences between the local labor market in the city districts. The parameters of interest
are δt which describe the effect of a job-search period t weeks after registration. Standard
errors are clustered at the level of the applicant to account for multiple applications per
individual.
Before, we showed that caseworkers usually target job-search periods towards younger
workers and those without children. If caseworkers are more likely to impose a job-search
period on applicants with better labor-market prospects, the OLS estimator of δt is biased.
We exploit our experimental design to estimate the causal effect of the job-search period
using two strategies. First, we replace SPi by the default option of the caseworker that
17
conducted the intake meeting of individual i:
Yiτtw = ατt + γwt + δ1,tNormali + δ2,tAlwaysi +Xiβt + uiτtw (2)
Because compliance was not perfect, δ1 and δ2 are the intention-to-treat effects (ITT).
The advantage of the ITT parameters is that they reflect the change in outcomes if the
welfare agency moves from abandoning job-search periods to the current policy (δ1), or to a
more strict ‘always’ policy (δ2). However, since the parameters average over all applicants
(including those that did not receive a job-search period), they do not reflect the effect of
actually imposing a job-search period. Therefore, we employ a second strategy, where we
instrument SPi with the default option of the caseworker that conducted the intake. We
estimate a first-stage equation of the form:
SPiτw = κτ + φw + λ1Normali + λ2Alwaysi +Xiθ + viτw (3)
In equation (3) λ1 and λ2 reflect the difference in the probability to receive a job-
search period for caseworkers with the default options ‘normal’ and ‘always’, compared
to the default option ‘never’. These parameters thus show the differences in compliance
rates to the different default options. We saw before that caseworkers with the default
option ‘normal’ (‘always’) give 36 percentage points (45 percentage points) more job-search
periods than caseworkers with the default option ‘never’.
Three key assumptions underlie our empirical strategy. First, for the default options
to be valid instruments, applicants’ assignment to a caseworker must be uncorrelated
with unobserved characteristics that can influence labor-market outcomes (conditional on
observed characteristics). As discussed before, applicants are assigned to caseworkers in
a process that is unrelated to applicant characteristics. Because applicants are assigned
to caseworkers within a local welfare office it is crucial to control for welfare office fixed
effects in our analysis. Otherwise differences in the number of job-search periods applied
under the default options could reflect differences in populations of applicants between
districts, for example, arising from differences in local labor-market conditions.
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A second assumption that is needed for the interpretation of the instrumental variables
estimates is instrument monotonicity. No individual would have received a job-search
period from a caseworker with default option ‘never’ and would not have received a job-
search period from a caseworker with default option ‘always’. This is very likely to hold for
the same caseworker. Formally, we see that within a local welfare office some caseworkers
have a higher job-search period rate under ‘never’ than (other caseworkers) under ‘normal’
or ‘always’. However, in our experiment some caseworkers only have a small number
of applicants per default option and observed differences in the fraction of applied job-
search periods can also reflect differences in the average characteristics of the applicants.
Furthermore, recall that only very few job-search periods are applied under the default
option ‘never’. Therefore, it is likely that an applicant who would receive a job-search
period under ‘never’ would also get this under any of the other options in which case the
monotonicity assumption holds.
Finally, the probability that an individual finds employment (with or without a job-
search period) should not be related to whether other individuals receive a job-search
period (stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA)). Our design increased the prob-
ability for some applicants to receive a job-search period, but decreased it for others, so
on average approximately the same amount of job-search periods were given as before the
experiment started. Furthermore, the treated population in the experiment is only a small
fraction of the total population of unemployed workers in Amsterdam, which consisted of
around 42,000 individuals in 2013. Therefore, it is not likely that the applied job-search
periods in our population have substantial spillover or general equilibrium effects.
Using instrumental variables, we estimate a Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE)
(Angrist et al., 1996). The effect of a job-search period is only identified for the group
applicants for which the caseworkers complied to their default options. In section 7 we
elaborate further on the definition of compliers in the setting of the experiment and the
interpretation of our estimated effect of a job-search period.
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Graphical evidence
We start with a graphical description of how labor-market outcomes are related to the
three default options, before turning to a more detailed regression analysis. Figure 3
presents the evolution of the fraction of applicants receiving welfare benefits by default
option. Three issues are important before interpreting the figure. First, an individual is
counted as receiving benefits in a certain week if payments of benefits were made that
are assigned to that week. For example, if an applicant returns after a job-search period
and receives benefits retrospectively from the moment of initial registration, this person
is counted as benefits recipient from registration onwards (even though the first payment
took place after eight weeks). A mechanical effect of the job-search period, the delayed
payment of the first benefits, can, therefore, not be a driver of possible effects. Second,
from the figure it is clear that take-up of welfare benefits is less than 100 percent for all
three default options. This arises because eligibility for welfare benefits is only determined
if the application for benefits is activated, so after the intake meeting and a possible
job-search period. Our sample describes individuals who registered for benefits and who
had an intake meeting, which was the moment of randomization. Conditioning on actual
welfare-benefits entitlement leads to possible confounding effects, since for individuals who
do not re-apply for welfare benefits after a job-search period, welfare-benefits entitlement
is not determined. Third, we also see that during the first five weeks the fraction of benefits
recipients increases for all three default options. The increase is due to people who register
at the welfare office before the date of exhaustion of UI benefits. This is advised by the
unemployment insurance office to prevent financial problems due to the processing time
in which no welfare benefits are received.
Figure 3 shows that under the default option ‘never’ the fraction of people receiving
welfare benefits is higher than under the default ‘always’. The fraction receiving welfare
benefits under the default option ‘normal’ lies in between, but is closer to the default option
‘always’. This suggests that a job-search period has a substantial effect on the probability
to receive welfare benefits. Over time the differences between the three default options
decrease, but 26 weeks after registration applicants under the default option ‘never’ are
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Figure 3: Fraction of applicants receiving welfare benefits by default option
still more likely to receive benefits.
5 Results
The discussion of our empirical results is divided into five parts. We first present estimates
of the effect of a job-search period on the likelihood to receive welfare benefits. We continue
with estimates of the effects on earnings and other benefits, followed by a discussion of
the impact on crime. Finally, we look at the long-term effects of a job-search period.
Welfare benefits
In Figure 4a we plot the point estimates and 90 percent confidence intervals of the
intention-to-treat effect on the probability to receive welfare benefits (0/1) estimated sep-
arately for each week after registration (following equation (2)). In this figure, the default
options ‘always’ and ‘normal’ are compared to the default option ‘never’. Individuals with
a caseworker with default option ‘always’ have a ten percentage points lower probability
to collect some welfare benefits. Over time the effect becomes slightly smaller. Individuals
with a caseworker with the default ‘normal’ have a six percentage points lower probability
to receive welfare. More than 20 weeks after registration both effects are still significantly
different from zero. The results are summarized in Table 3, which reports the effects of the
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Figure 4: Probability to receive welfare benefits (colored areas are 90 percent confidence
intervals)
default options on cumulative outcomes half a year after registration. The first and second
column provide estimates that only include controls for calendar time and welfare office,
the third and fourth column also control for characteristics of the applicant. The estimates
hardly change when including these additional control variables, which is expected since
the default options are randomly assigned. Table 3 shows that compared to the default
option ‘never’, applicants in the default group ‘normal’ receive benefits, on average, 1.72
weeks shorter. For applicants in the group ‘always’ the effect is larger and amounts to
a reduction of 2.18 weeks. Recall that this is not a mechanical effect of the job-search
period, since entitlement to benefits starts at the date of initial registration.
To get an idea about the size of the effect of a job-search period, we next estimate the
effect using our instrumental variables approach. The first-stage estimates of the default
options on the probability to impose a job-search period are respectively 0.34 (s.e. 0.02) for
the default ‘normal’ and 0.46 (s.e. 0.02) for the default ‘never’, with an F-statistic for joint
significance of the instrumental variables equal to 237. Figure 4b plots the point estimates
of the instrumental variables estimates of the probability to receive welfare. A job-search
period lowers the probability to receive welfare benefits with around 20 percentage points
in the first ten weeks. Given that in the group with the default option ‘never’ total take
up of welfare benefits is around 80 percent this implies a reduction of about 25 percent.
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Table 3: Effect of job-search period on cumulative outcomes 26 weeks after initial regis-
tration
Intention to treat Intention to treat IV
Always Normal Always Normal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Weeks on welfare -2.05*** -1.64*** -2.18*** -1.72*** -4.78***
(0.63) (0.56) (0.62) (0.56) (1.25)
Benefits received (in e) -372*** -260** -389*** -261** -814***
(142) (127) (141) (126) (287)
Earnings (in e) 348 291 407* 342* 909**
(225) (197) (220) (195) (449)
Other benefits (in e) -50 -51 -42 -68 -122
(98) (88) (95) (87) (199)
Total income (in e) -74 19 -25 13 -27
(218) (193) (213) (189) (438)
Weeks with earnings 0.71 0.35 0.75 0.40 1.48
(0.35) (0.54) (0.60) (0.54) (1.23)
Hours worked 26* 18 30* 21 64**
(16) (14) (16) (14) (31)
Hourly wage (in e) 0.71 0.30 0.72 0.26 1.78
(conditional on work) (0.60) (0.43) (0.58) (0.43) (1.33)
Observations 2788 2788 2788
Included controls:
Calendar time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Local office fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Applicant characteristics No Yes Yes
Note: Columns (1) and (2) and columns (3) and (4) in each row represent each one regression.
The fifth column represents a separate regression. The applicant characteristics are age at
registration, gender, household composition, cumulative income in 24 months before registration
and dummies for five education categories. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the appli-
cant. The outcome variable hourly wage is not a cumulative outcome, it refers to the average hourly
wage in 26 weeks after registration. ∗∗∗ =significant at 1% level, ∗∗ =at 5% level, ∗ =at 10% level
After the tenth week the effect somewhat decreases to 11 percentage points in week 26.
The effect of a job-search period is still significantly different from zero 26 weeks after
registration. This implies that the job-search period does not only have a short-run effect,
but also has a more profound and longer lasting effect on welfare uptake. The first row
of Table 3 shows that a job-search period reduces the period of receiving welfare benefits
with 4.8 weeks.
Figure 4b uses a binary variable for receiving welfare benefits. Welfare recipients are,
23
however, obliged to also accept part-time jobs and, therefore, also partial outflow can take
place. To look at the total impact of the job-search period on welfare receipt Figure 5a
shows the effect on the amount of welfare benefits received by an applicant. The pattern
is quite similar to the pattern in Figure 4b with the binary welfare variable. The job-
search period has a strong effect on welfare receipt that is long lasting and only becomes
insignificant after 24 weeks. On average, about 30 euro per week is saved on welfare benefits
if a job-search period is imposed. Table 3 shows that total welfare benefits payments in
the first six months decrease with 814 euro, which amounts to a 25 percent reduction of
the mean cumulative amount of welfare during the first 26 weeks.
Income from wages and other benefits
Not receiving welfare benefits does not necessarily imply that someone is employed. A
job-search period can discourage applicants to apply for welfare because of increased ap-
plication costs and the complexity of the application process. The remainder of Figure 5
shows the effect of a job-search period on other sources of income. In particular, Figure 5b
shows the effect of the job-search period on weekly income from employment. A job-search
period has a positive effect on earnings of about 30 euro per week that becomes significant
after five weeks. After 14 weeks the effect steadily increases to 50 euro a week. Table 3
shows that during the first half year after registration imposing a job-search period, on
average, induces individuals to earn in total 909 euro more. These additional earnings thus
completely compensate (112 percent) the forgone welfare benefits of a job-search period.10
A spillover effect of a job-search period can be that individuals try to get income from
other benefit schemes or apply for welfare benefits in a different municipality. We do
not expect large effects here, as welfare should be the safety net and people can only
apply if they are not entitled to any other benefit scheme. Furthermore, to apply for
welfare benefits in a different municipality, people need to move. Figure 5c shows the
10Recall that our experiment took place during an economic downturn (see Figure B1 in the appendix).
The effects can be different when labor-market conditions change. During the second half of the experi-
mental period, there was a sharp increase in the inflow into welfare benefits. However, we find that the
estimated effects of a job-search period are the same for applicants in both time periods. Within this
limited time frame, we, therefore, do not find strong evidence that the effects vary with labor-market
conditions.
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Figure 5: Instrumental variable estimates of the effects of a job-search period on labor-
market outcomes t − τ weeks after registration (colored areas are 90 percent confidence
intervals)
estimated effect on income from other benefit schemes and these are indeed small and
insignificant. This is confirmed by the insignificant effect on cumulative other benefits in
Table 3. Finally, the effect of a job-search period on total income (the sum of income from
welfare, wages and other benefits) is shown in Figure 5d. During the first four weeks the
effect on total income is negative and (almost) significant. After that, the effect is close to
zero and insignificant. The effect on cumulative total income is small and not significantly
different from zero (see Table 3). The negative effect during the first four weeks might be
caused by individuals that find employment during the job-search period, and, therefore,
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never collect any welfare benefits.
The increase in earnings can be driven by three different channels. First, an increased
probability to be employed, second, an increase in hours worked, and third, an increase in
the hourly wage. In the remainder of Table 3 we look at several outcomes to distinguish
these channels. A job-search period does not have a significant effect on the number of
weeks that an applicant has a non-zero wage, although the point estimate is positive.
The number of hours worked is, however, significantly larger after a job-search period.
In particular, imposing a job-search period increases the total working hours with, on
average, 64 hours, an increase of 36 percent. This signals that a job-search period mainly
increases the likelihood to find a full-time job compared to finding a part-time job in which
the applicant does not earn enough to leave benefits. Finally, we estimate the effect on the
hourly wage (conditional on having a job).11 A job-search period can reduce the quality
of the job that individuals are willing to accept, in case they are liquidity constraint and
quickly accept a job to have income. On the other hand, receiving benefits can have a
stigma effect on future employers by giving a bad signal about the quality of the employee.
In that case, the reduced likelihood to receive benefits can translate into a positive effect
on the hourly wage. The positive estimated effect on wages reported in Table 3 points in
the direction of the second explanation, although the effect is not significant.12
Crime
A job-search period increases the time that an individual has to bridge before receiving the
first welfare-benefits payment. Applicants of welfare benefits are unlikely to have access to
savings or credit that can cover such temporary cash shortfalls. The policy is not to impose
job-search periods on welfare applicants with severe financial problems. But, individuals
11We condition on having a job in order to abstract from the possible employment effect of a job-search
period. If a job-search period has a positive effect on the employment probability including the zeros
could wrongly lead to the conclusion that a job-search period leads to a better paid job. Conditioning on
having a job implies that there is a possible composition effect. If more people with a job-search period
work and also those with a lower wage potential work, the results for hourly wage are biased downwards.
12A third explanation could be an experience effect. Applicants with a job-search period find a job
earlier and the longer experience is reflected in the hourly wage. However, given the short time frame (26
weeks) this explanation is not likely to play a large role.
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with low earnings prospects may still turn to crime to supplement their income during the
job-search period. Foley (2011) finds that in the US crime rates increase in the amount of
time that has passed since welfare payments occurred. Table 2 shows that in our sample
nine percent has been suspect of a crime in 2012 and/or 2013 (compared to approximately
two percent of the total population aged between 27 and 65) which indicates that for our
population crime is not an irrelevant outcome.
Before turning to the results a few things need to be mentioned. First, by the nature
of the data, we only consider registered crime, which likely underestimates actual crime.
There is, however, not a clear reason to suspect a systematic difference between treatment
groups. Second, we only know whether an individual was registered as a suspect of a
crime, not whether she was actually convicted. However, in the Netherlands, on average,
90 percent of the registered suspects are declared guilty (Statistics Netherlands et al.,
2013), such that this is a very strong indicator for actually having committed a crime.
Third, we do not know the exact date of the crime, just the year in which the crime was
registered. This means that we cannot consider the exact time elapsed between registration
for benefits and the crime. We take as an outcome whether an individual was suspected
of a crime in the year 2012 and/or 2013 (remember that the experiment started in April
2012 and ended in March 2013). This means that the crime could have taken place before
the job-search period started. Given the randomized design there is no reason to suspect
a difference in crime rates before the start of the experiment.
We find no evidence that a job-search period increases crime rates. With a point
estimate of -0.02 (s.e. 0.04), the instrumental variables estimate of a job-search period on
total crime is both not significantly different from zero and has the wrong sign. Following
Foley (2011), we also look only at property crimes, to separate out crimes that have a
financial motivation. For these crimes the point estimate is -0.01 (s.e. 0.03). To check
whether the effects are sensitive to the definition of our outcome measure we repeat the
analysis by period of registration, and only for crimes committed in 2013. Again, we find
no evidence of an effect of the job-search period on crime.
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Long-run effects
So far, we have mainly looked at outcomes up to half a year after registration. In Fig-
ure 4b we saw that 26 weeks after registration the effect of a job-search period becomes
insignificant. A job-search period can still have long-run effects. If a job-search period
causes individuals to accept temporary low-wage jobs and individuals without a job-search
period find more stable employment, then the long-run effect of a job-search period can
be negative. Table 4 presents the instrumental variable estimates for 26, 52 and 78 weeks
after registration. For 78 weeks the sample is smaller because in the current dataset not
everyone is observed in the data for such a long period.
Table 4 shows that, although precision decreases due to larger standard errors, the
point estimates are fairly stable over time. The main effect of a job-search period thus
takes place during the first 26 weeks, and after that not much changes, neither in a
positive nor in a negative way. The reductions in welfare-benefits payments are, therefore,
permanent savings, that are not offset by a later increase in benefit dependency.13 One
thing that stands out is the positive and significant effect on the hourly wage one year after
registration, an increase of 21 percent. This result contradicts the idea that a job-search
period induces applicants to accept lower quality jobs. A possible explanation is that
collecting welfare benefits has a negative stigma. Another possible explanation is that
during the job-search period individuals can decide themselves which jobs to apply to,
which may result in a better match than when the welfare agency assists in the job-search
process.
6 Heterogeneous treatment effects
In this section we explore heterogeneity in the effect of a job-search period. First, we
consider three important determinants of labor-market outcomes: age, gender and educa-
tion. Second, we study variation in the effect by looking at the income distribution. This
is motivated by the concern that although a job-search period might, on average, have
13To know whether this also holds for the really long run we have to repeat our analysis in the future.
Because our data are linked to the microdata database of Statistics Netherlands, this can be realized later.
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Table 4: Instrumental variable estimates for the effect of a job-search period on cumulative
long-run outcomes
Weeks since registration
26 weeks 52 weeks 78 weeks
(1) (2) (3)
Weeks on welfare -4.78*** -5.87** -8.40*
(1.25) (2.47) (4.98)
Benefits received (in e) -814*** -824 -971
(287) (536) (1063)
Earnings (in e) 909** 965 765
(449) (971) (2069)
Other benefits (in e) -122 -7 542
(199) (390) (856)
Total income (in e) -27 133 337
(438) (938) (2020)
Weeks with earnings 1.48 0.42 0.10
(1.23) (2.39) (4.82)
Hours worked 64** 62 40
(31) (68) (144)
Hourly wage (in e) (conditional on work) 1.38 1.76** 1.72
(1.17) (0.79) (1.26)
Observations 2788 2788 1399
Included controls:
Calendar time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Local office fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Applicant characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Note: Each cell represents one regression. The applicant characteristics are age at
registration, gender, household composition, cumulative income in 24 months before
before registration and dummies for five education categories. Standard errors are clust-
ered at the level of the applicant. The outcome variable hourly wage is not a cumulative
outcome, it refers to the average hourly wage in 26, 52 or 78 weeks after registration
∗∗∗ =significant at 1% level, ∗∗ =at 5% level, ∗ =at 10% level
a positive effect on labor-market outcomes, there can still be a group that is seriously
harmed by a job-search period.
Gender, age and education
We distinguish between three education levels, at least a bachelor degree (28 percent
of the sample), a basic qualification (36 percent) and less than a basic qualification (36
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Figure 6: Effect on receiving welfare benefits by level of education
percent).14 Next, we estimate a model with interactions between these education levels
and treatment. Figure 6 shows the effects on receiving welfare benefits for three education
levels. For ease of presentation, the confidence intervals are not shown. The effects are
significant for almost all weeks for applicants with at least a bachelor degree and those
with a basic qualification. For the group with less than a basic qualification the point
estimates are also negative but the effect is not significant.
The effect of a job-search period on the probability to receive welfare benefits monoton-
ically declines with the level of education, and for the group with at least a bachelor degree
the effect is significantly different from the effect for applicants with less than a basic qual-
ification. For individuals with at least a bachelor degree a job-search period reduces the
probability to receive welfare benefits with almost 40 percentage points, translating into
a 50 percent reduction in the uptake of welfare benefits.
Table A3 in the appendix reports the effects on the other (cumulative) outcomes for
the different education groups. For most outcomes the effect sizes monotonically increase
with the level of education, and have the same sign for all three groups. For the number
of weeks on welfare benefits and total welfare benefits received the estimates for the group
with at least a bachelor degree are significantly different from those for applicants with less
14A basic qualification is the government definition for the minimum level of education needed to be self-
sufficient on the labor market. Such a qualification requires at least senior general secondary education,
pre-university education, or level-2 of senior secondary vocational education.
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than a basic qualification. Overall the results by education level suggest that a job-search
period is most effective for individuals that have better prospects on the labor market, as
reflected by their level of education.
We do not find any differential effects when we consider gender and age. Figure B2 in
the appendix shows the effect of a job-search period on the probability to receive benefits
split by gender (left) and above/below median age in our data (right). In both cases the
estimated coefficients are very similar. The lack of differential effects on these dimensions
can be a result of the characteristics of the target population. Compared to the general
population, welfare applicants are quite young (older workers have longer entitlement
to unemployment insurance benefits) and are less likely to have an (income-generating)
partner. Furthermore, job-search periods are only applied to individuals for whom there
are no direct restrictions to work.
Distributional impacts
In section 5 we found that the loss in benefits is completely (112 percent) compensated
by an increase in earnings. However, given that the minimum wage for a full-time job
(approximately 1200 euro per month) is substantially higher than the level of welfare
benefits the earnings gain can be unequally distributed along the income distribution. If
that is the case, a job-search period can still be harmful for part of the applicants. To
inquire this further we estimate the marginal distribution of the outcome under different
treatments for the subpopulation of compliers, following Imbens and Rubin (1997).15 For
sake of representation we take the default options ‘always’ and ‘normal’ together, thereby
reducing the instrument to a binary instrument. The analysis could, however, be extended
to consider both instruments separately.
Figure 7 plots the estimated distributions of cumulative income for applicants that did
or did not receive a job-search period because their caseworker complied with the default
options. Both 26 and 52 weeks after registration we see that the income distribution of
the ‘treated’ compliers shifts slightly to the right. The treated compliers are, however,
15This method is briefly explained in appendix C.
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Figure 7: Income distribution of compliers to the default options
more likely to have a very low (close to zero) cumulative income. This suggests that for
the majority of the applicants a job-search period has a positive effect on income because
they find a job in which they earn more than the benefits level. However, for a small
fraction of the applicants a job-search period leads to a higher probability of having a
very low income. Regression results (not reported) confirm that during the first ten weeks
after registration a job-search period leads to a higher probability to have an income below
150 euro per week. This is below the welfare-benefits level so after a job-search period
some individuals neither have earnings nor receive benefits. After ten weeks this effect is
no longer significant. This indicates that job-search periods cause that a few additional
individuals have a very low income for some weeks after registration.
In the previous subsection we reported that the effect of a job-search period is par-
ticularly large for highly educated applicants. Figure 8, therefore, estimates the complier
distributions split by level of education. We see that the higher probability of having very
low income is mainly driven by the highly educated applicants (with a bachelor and/or
master degree). Our preferred explanation is that there are two effective signals of a
job-search period. First, individuals are forced to actively look for employment during
the job-search period. Second, once starting collecting benefits, all jobs should be ac-
cepted, even if the work requirements are far below the educational and experience level of
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Figure 8: Income distribution (after 26 weeks) of compliers to the default options
the applicant. For highly educated individuals the second signal is more important than
for individuals with lower education, which may even cause that some highly educated
individuals choose no income over collecting welfare benefits.
7 Interpretation
The estimated effect of a job-search period should be interpreted as a local average treat-
ment effect. Recall that caseworkers decide about imposing a job-search period and that
decisions depend on the randomly assigned default options. In this section we provide
some interpretation of the compliers for which we estimate the average treatment effect
and test if the estimated effect changes when we consider other groups of compliers. The
latter is also informative about how well caseworkers can target job-search periods.
Suppose it is possible to rank applicants according to an (unobserved) index which
we refer to as the propensity not to receive a job-search period. This propensity can be
based on characteristics observed by the caseworker, but not by us. Applicants that are
always given a job-search period have propensity zero and applicants with a propensity
of one never receive a job-search period. For ease of presentation we assume that these
propensities are uniformly distributed. And for the moment we assume that there is no
heterogeneity among caseworkers when executing the three default options. Then, the
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default options can be translated into thresholds. Under the default option ‘never’ job-
search periods are only assigned to applicants with a propensity less than 0.09 and these
applicants are the always takers. Under the default option ‘always’ all applicants with a
propensity less than 0.55 are assigned a job-search period. Therefore, applicants with a
propensity above 0.55 are the never takers and those with a propensity between 0.09 and
0.55 are compliers. The default option ‘normal’ splits the compliers in two groups. First,
applicants with a propensity between 0.09 and 0.46 who comply to both the default option
‘normal’ and ‘always’. And second, applicants with a propensity between 0.46 and 0.55,
who only comply to the default option ‘always’.
If the effect of a job-search period is the same for all applicants, or if it only depends on
applicants’ characteristics that do not affect the propensity, the average treatment effects
will be the same for the compliers to the default options ‘normal’ and ‘always’ (Heckman
and Vytlacil, 2001). However, there may be applicant-level heterogeneity in the response
to the job-search period. For example, caseworkers may target job-search periods mainly
to applicants for whom they expect the largest effects. In that case the effect is decreasing
in the applicant’s propensity and the estimated effect depends on the thresholds chosen by
the caseworker. This relates to Heckman and Vytlacil (2001), who develop a framework
in which they express treatment parameters as different weighted averages of the marginal
treatment effects. In our case this means that the average treatment effect is smaller for
the compliers to the default option ‘always’ than for the compliers to the default option
‘normal’.
Nonparametric identification of the full set of marginal treatment effects requires an
instrument that generates variation on the full support of the probability of treatment
assignment. Our default options do not have this property.16 However, we consider two
alternative approaches to investigate if the effect of a job-search period declines in the
applicant’s propensity to receive a job-search period. First, we exploit that we have two
default options deviating from ‘never’ (i.e. ‘normal’ and ‘always’), which generate different
16We could exploit differences in rates at which caseworkers assign job-search periods under the different
default options (e.g. Maestas et al. (2013)). This yields much more variation, but in our case the average
number of applicants per caseworker is low. This analysis would incorporate too much noise.
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Table 5: Comparing the two instruments, outcomes 26 weeks after registration
Total P-value Normal vs Always vs
sample over-id Never Normal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Weeks on welfare -4.78*** 0.88 -5.17*** -4.02
(1.25) (1.63) (4.59)
Benefits received (in e) -814*** 0.75 -723* -1063
(287) (371) (1024)
Earnings (in e) 909** 0.83 979* 733
(449) (582) (1650)
Other benefits (in e) -122 0.61 -246 125
(199) (258) (689)
Total income (in e) -27 0.84 10 -204
(438) (562) (1526)
Weeks with earnings 1.48 0.72 1.10 3.19
(1.23) (1.60) (4.51)
Cum. hours worked 64** 0.91 64 87
(31) (41) (121)
Mean hourly wage (in e) 1.38 0.49 0.55 3.30
(conditional on work) (1.17) (1.27) (3.30)
First stage coefficient default normal 0.34*** 0.34***
(0.02) (0.02)
First stage coefficient default always 0.46*** 0.12***
(0.02) (0.03)
Observations 2788 2217 2228
Included controls:
Calendar time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Local office fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Applicant characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Note: Each cell represents one equation. The applicant characteristics are age at registration,
gender, household composition, cumulative income in 24 months before registration and dummies
for five education categories. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the applicant.
∗∗∗ =significant at 1% level, ∗∗ =at 5% level, ∗ =at 10% level
groups of compliers. And second, we increase the group of compliers by only considering
caseworkers with high compliance rates to the default options.
For the first approach we perform overidentification tests. In the LATE-framework
with two valid instrumental variables, rejection of the overidentification test indicates
that treatment effects are heterogeneous (Angrist and Fernandez-Val, 2013). The intuition
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Figure 9: Percentage of job-search periods applied by default option and caseworker
is that both instrumental variables define different groups of compliers which may have
different average treatment effects. The second column of Table 5 shows that the p-values
for this overidentification test are for none of the outcomes below 0.49. This suggests either
that both complier populations are very similar or that there is not much heterogeneity in
the marginal treatment effects. Given that the default options ‘always’ and ‘normal’ yield
complier populations which largely overlap, the first explanation is not unlikely.
Next, we estimate the effect of a job-search period using two different strategies. First,
we instrument the job-search period with the default option ‘normal’ with as a reference
the default option ‘never’. Second, we instrument the job-search period with the default
option ‘always’ with as a reference the default option ‘normal’. The first strategy captures
the average treatment effect for applicants with a propensity between 0.09 and 0.46, while
the second strategy captures the average treatment effect for applicants with a propensity
between 0.46 and 0.55. For the first strategy, we exclude all applicants under the default
option ‘always’, and for the second strategy we exclude all applicants under the default
option ‘never’. If caseworkers, indeed, mainly target job-search periods to applicants for
which effects are highest, the estimated effects should be smaller when estimated under
the second strategy. Table 5 presents the results for the total sample (column (1)) and for
the two strategies (columns (3) and (4)). The estimates in the third column are not very
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precise, due to less power in the first stage, but the point estimates are very similar to
those in the second column. Again, there is no evidence that marginal treatment effects
are decreasing in the propensity not to receive a job-search period.
This first approach exploits the difference in the rate at which job-search periods are
applied under the default option ‘normal’ and ‘always’. Recall that the rates are not very
different, which affects the power of the analysis. Furthermore, it can be that marginal
treatment effects are very different for those applicants with much higher propensities.
Therefore, we consider the individual compliance of each caseworker. Figure 9a shows
for each caseworkers the rate at which they impose job-search periods under the default
options ‘normal’ and ‘never’. Each circle represents a caseworker and the size of the circle
describes the number of applicants a caseworker has under the default option ‘never’.
Three things come to the attention. First, there is substantial variation in the rate at
which caseworkers assign job-search periods under the default option ‘normal’. There are
also caseworkers who almost never apply a job-search period. Second, caseworkers who
normally assign many job-search periods, substantially reduce this if they are assigned the
default option ‘never’. And third, there are a few caseworkers who do not change behavior
when being assigned the default option ‘never’, i.e. under this default option they impose
job-search periods as often as under the default option ‘normal’.
Figure 9b shows the same figure but now comparing the default option ‘always’ with
the default option ‘normal’. The figure is less pronounced than the previous figure. Ob-
viously, many caseworkers find it difficult to impose job-search periods more often than
usually. There are also some caseworkers who normally already impose job-search peri-
ods so often that this can hardly be increased when they are assigned the default option
‘always’. Finally, there are some caseworkers who more or less refuse to give job-search
periods. Even under the default option ‘always’ they (almost) never apply job-search peri-
ods. Because within local offices applicants are randomly assigned to caseworkers, we can
restrict our sample to caseworkers with substantial compliance rates without harming the
randomization. In Table 6 we proceed in three steps and remove applicants of caseworkers
who do not comply with the following rules:
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Table 6: Outcomes for different groups of compliers
Total Never<20% Never<10% Never<10%
sample Always>40% Always>40% Always>60%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Weeks on welfare -4.78*** -4.28*** -4.66*** -5.72***
(1.25) (1.21) (1.26) (1.55)
Benefits received (in e) -814*** -647** -749*** -813**
(287) (275) (285) (326)
Earnings (in e) 909** -832* 912** 1386***
(449) (429) (440) (518)
Other benefits (in e) -122 -127 -86 -83
(199) (184) (199) (239)
Total income (in e) -27 58 77 490
(438) (422) (434) (511)
Weeks with earnings 1.48 1.60 1.92 2.99**
(1.23) (1.17) (1.23) (1.39)
Cum. hours worked 64** 54* 58* 83**
(31) (30) (31) (37)
Mean hourly wage (in e) 1.38 1.63 0.81 1.05
(conditional on work) (1.17) (1.19) (0.97) (1.08)
First stage default normal 0.34*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.39***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
First stage default always 0.46*** 0.55*** 0.56*** 0.63***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 2788 2373 2207 1603
Included controls:
Calendar time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local office fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Applicant characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Each cell represents one equation. The applicant characteristics are age at registration,
gender, household composition, cumulative income in 24 months before registration and dummies
for five education categories. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the applicant.
∗∗∗ =significant at 1% level, ∗∗ =at 5% level, ∗ =at 10% level
1. Fraction ‘never’ <20% & fraction ‘always’ >40%
2. Fraction ‘never’ <10% & fraction ‘always’ >40%
3. Fraction ‘never’ <10% & fraction ‘always’ >60%
We only remove observations if a caseworker had more than five applicants in the
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relevant default options, such that we do not run the risk of removing caseworkers that had
a very peculiar draw of applicants. A regression of an indicator for the different samples
that remain under these selection criteria on applicant characteristics shows that there are
no observable differences between applicants in the different groups (see Table A4 in the
appendix). Only the indicator for the local welfare office is significant. This confirms that
compliance to the experiment differ between local offices. Table 6 presents the estimated
effects for the job-search periods for the different subsamples. At the bottom of the table
we see that by removing non-complying caseworkers, the first-stage coefficients increase.
In the most strictly defined sample (column 4) the estimates now cover propensities from
0.06 to 0.71 percent. Looking at the results, there is no evidence that the effect of a job-
search period decreases with the propensity not to apply a job-search period. The effect
on earnings even becomes slightly larger.
Overall both strategies do not provide evidence that the effect of a job-search period
decreases in the propensity not to receive a job-search period. It also shows that the
local average treatment effect are not sensitive to changes in the sample and the group of
compliers. Obviously, caseworkers do not succeed in targeting job-search periods to those
applicants for which the effects are largest. Finally, the results suggest that the estimated
local average treatment is generalizable to a larger share of the sample.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we use a field experiment, in combination with detailed administrative data,
to study mandatory job-search periods for new applicants of welfare benefits. Our empir-
ical results provide evidence for a strong and persistent effect of a job-search period on re-
ceipt of welfare benefits. Six months after applying for welfare the total benefits payments
are reduced by, on average, 25 percent. The reduced welfare benefits are fully compensated
(112 percent) by increased income from employment and there are no spillovers to other
benefit schemes. The effect of a job-search period increases with education, for applicants
with at least a bachelor degree the likelihood to collect welfare benefits decreases with 50
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percent.
The job-search requirement of a job-search period can increase the likelihood to find
a job, but job-search periods can also increases the complexity of the welfare-benefits
application. Our results suggest that the increased complexity of the application process
does not hurt the most vulnerable applicants. In particular, we do not find evidence for
negative side-effects, such as engagement in criminal behavior. Therefore, the increased
job-finding and reduced welfare dependency indicate that a job-search period is an effective
instrument for targeting welfare benefits to those people who need it most.
The job-search requirement and the waiting period, are easily transferable to other
situations, which suggests that job-search periods can also be useful policy instruments
for unemployment insurance and disability insurance. In addition, the administrative costs
of imposing a job-search period are small and it is an early intervention that can prevent
more costly interventions later during the period of benefits dependency. However, the
population in our experiment has two important features. First, they do not have serious
limitations to work. Second, all applicants are liquidity constraint, otherwise they would
not be eligible for welfare benefits. These aspects of the applicant population might be
essential for a successful implementation of a job-search period in other settings.
Randomized experiments with welfare applicants are still rare. We show that using
an encouragement design which allowed for opting out in special cases, it is possible
to evaluate (existing) policies for welfare applicants. The opt-out possibility has been
important to obtain support of caseworkers, which ensured sufficient compliance to our
randomization. Finally, the design of our experiment allowed us to also study whether
caseworkers are able to target search periods to those clients for whom they are most
effective. We find that this is not the case, a job-search period is effective for a larger
share of the applicants than the population on which caseworkers normally impose a job-
search period. Our results suggest that the welfare administration should instruct the
caseworkers to more frequently apply job-search periods.
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A Additional tables
Table A1: Characteristics of the target population
Mean
Financial situation
Good 26%
Average 48%
Bad 26%
Estimated level of independence (by the caseworker) of the applicant
Very independent 40%
Somewhat independent 54%
Completely not independent 6%
Estimated time (by the caseworker) until exit to employment
Less than 1 month 13%
2 to 3 months 39%
4 to 5 months 31%
6 months or more 17%
Reason application for welfare
Lost job 16%
End self-employment 8%
End unemployment insurance benefits 34%
Other reason 42%
Other characteristics
Non-western immigrant 56%
Ever received welfare before 47%
Note: The information in the first four panels of this table is taken from the forms
that caseworkers filled in for the applicants that were part of the experiment. These
forms were completed for 72 percent of the sample. The information in the lowest
panel is for the complete sample and was derived by linking the experimental
sample to administrative data of Statistics Netherlands. The degree of independence
indicates whether the applicant is self-reliant and is able to independently search for
work.
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Table A2: Targeting job-search periods by caseworkers under default ‘normal’
Job-search period p-value diff
No Yes
(1) (2) (3)
Female 40% 37% 0.32
Partner 13% 11% 0.01
Children 16% 11% 0.00
Age under 30 20% 30% 0.00
Age 31 - 36 21% 26% 0.02
Age 37 - 45 30% 23% 0.00
Age above 45 29% 21% 0.00
Bachelor/Master 26% 27% 0.32
Vocational 24% 24% 0.90
High school 13% 9% 0.02
Preparatory vocational 22% 20% 0.36
Primary education 10% 10% 0.73
Education missing 1% 5% 0.00
Annual income in previous 2 years (x1000 e) 13.7 13.3 0.32
Number of observations 899 758
Note: The p-values in the last three columns are weighted by the office of registration,
as randomization took place within welfare office.
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Table A3: Effects by level of education 26 weeks after registration
Education level
Low Middle High
(1) (2) (3)
Weeks on welfare -2.49 -4.32** -7.94***
(2.15) (1.98) (2.16)
Benefits received (in e) -277 -838* -1442***
(483) (470) (488)
Earnings (in e) 562 1113 1060
(633) (687) (953)
Other benefits (in e) -283 -24 -66
(366) (298) (358)
Cum. total income (in e) 1 251 -447
(617) (673) (943)
Weeks with earnings 0.57 2.19 1.61
(2.12) (1.79) (2.10)
Cum. hours worked 36 101** 46
(53) (46) (58)
Mean hourly wage (in e) -0.69 1.79 3.03
(conditional on work) (1.80) (1.50) (2.14)
Observations 1011 1007 770
Included controls:
Calendar time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Local office fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Applicant characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Note: Each row in this table represents one regression including
interactions for the different subgroups. The applicant
characteristics are age at registration, gender, household
composition, cumulative income 24 months before registration
and dummies for five education categories. Standard errors are
clustered at the level of the applicant.
∗∗∗ =significant at 1% level, ∗∗ =at 5% level, ∗ =at 10% level
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Table A4: Characteristics of different groups of compliers
Nev.<20% Nev.<10% Nev.<10%
Alw.>40% Alw.>40% Alw.>60%
(1) (2) (3)
Applicant characteristics
Female -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Partner 0.02 -0.01 -0.02
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Children 0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Age 31 - 36 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Age 37 - 45 -0.01 -0.00 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Age above 45 0.03 0.04** 0.05*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Bachelor/Master -0.04* -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Vocational -0.03 -0.00 -0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
High school 0.02 0.04 -0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Prep. vocational 0.00 0.03 0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Education missing -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Income 2 yrs before (x1000 e) 0.00* 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Location of registration
Southeast 0.08*** 0.25*** -0.32***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
North 0.03 0.12*** 0.19***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Centrum/East 0.02 0.19*** 0.11***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
New West -0.01 0.17*** 0.02
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Quarter of registration
Quarter 2 0.02 -0.00 -0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Quarter 3 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Quarter 4 -0.00 0.01 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Note: ∗∗∗ =significant at 1% level, ∗∗ =at 5% level, ∗ =at 10% level
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Figure B1: Inflow and outflow of welfare between 2008 and 2014 and macroeconomic
indicators (source: Statistics Netherlands)
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Figure B2: Instrumental variables estimates of the effects of a job-search period by age
and gender t−τ weeks after registration (colored areas are 90 percent confidence intervals)
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C Estimation of outcome distributions for compliers
Imbens and Rubin (1997) show how to estimate the marginal distribution of outcomes
under different treatments for the subpopulation of compliers. In this section we briefly
review their approach.17 Yi(1) and Yi(0) will denote the applicant’s total income with and
without a job-search period, respectively. Di denotes the default option of the caseworker
to whom the applicant is matched, where Di = 1 indicates the defaults ‘always’ or ‘normal’
andDi = 0 the default ‘never’. SPi indicates whether the applicant had a job-search period
(0/1).
For each observation we observe the triple (Di, SP i, Yi), where Yi is the observed out-
come. From the data we cannot directly identify the compliers, but we can identify some
always takers (Di = 0 and SPi = 1) and some never takers (Di = 1 and SPi = 0).
Because of the randomization, the value of the default option will be independent of the
applicant’s type, we can infer the distribution of Yi(0) for never takers and Yi(1) for always
takers. These distributions are denoted by ga(y) and gn(y). The population proportions
of compliers (φc), always takers (φa) and never takers (φn) can be identified from the data.
The distributions of interest are the distributions of Yi(0) and Yi(1) for compliers,
described as gc0(y) and gc1(y). These cannot be directly observed from the data because
the outcome distribution of applicants for whom Di = 0 and SPi = 0 consists both of
never takers and compliers. Correspondingly, in the outcome distribution of applicants
with Di = 1 and SPi = 1 there will be both always takers and compliers.
We denote the directly estimable distributions of Yi for the subsample defined by
Di = d and SPi = sp as fd,sp(y). This implies that ga(y) = f01(y) and gn(y) = f10(y).
Imbens and Rubin (1997) show that the distributions for applicants that did or did not
receive a job-search period because their caseworker complied to the default options can
be expressed in terms of the directly estimable distributions in the following way:
gc0(y) =
φc + φn
φc
f00(y)− φn
φc
f10(y), (4)
17The notation in this appendix is partly taken from Ketel et al. (2015).
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and,
gc0(y) =
φc + φa
φc
f11(y)− φa
φc
f01(y). (5)
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